strengthening intellectual property rights can exacerbate the second market failure, leading firms to charge too much for their new knowledge, such that the diffusion of new knowledge that takes place is less than the social optimum. Thus, there is a tradeoff between incentives for the socially efficient production of new knowledge and the incentives for its socially efficient diffusion. Given this dilemma, research consortia in which firms pool their research resources to share both the costs and benefits of R&D, may offer a solution. By joining forces, firms internalize the externality created through spillovers. Since each participant is privy to the research results, the 'transmission' problem is solved as well.
Unfortunately, the theoretical contribution by Katz [1986] revealed that research consortia have problems of their own. If firms cooperate in R&D, but compete in the product market, then the increased incentive to do R&D is possibly vitiated by the impact of the shared R&D output on subsequent market competition. If that higher level of R&D makes ex post market competition more intense, either by lowering firms' marginal cost of production or 'crowding' the product space with larger numbers of differentiated products, then the resulting decline in profits, if internalized by the firms, will reduce their incentives to do R&D. Katz showed that research consortia can, under some conditions, result in less R&D as firms seek to lessen the severity of competition in the product market and raise profits. These results were echoed in later work by d'Aspremont and Jacquemin [1988] and Suzumura [1992] .
Katz assumed that the amount of spillovers received by a firm did not depend on its level of R&D spending. Subsequent contributions to this theoretical literature, notably the contribution by Cohen and Levinthal [1989] argued that this is unlikely. If the amount of spillovers received by a firm depends (positively) on its level of R&D spending, then the presence of spillovers in general and participation in spillover-enhancing consortia in particular might lead to increased rather than decreased levels of R&I spending. In the empirical model of spillovers that we present in this paper, we implicitly follow Cohen and Levinthal in assuming that the level of potential R&D spillovers depends on current and past levels of R&D spending.
Along with the development of the theory of cooperative R&D, there has been an expansion in its practice. Since the late 1970s, governments throughout the developed world have adopted policies to spur the development of cooperative R&D. The United States granted broad antitrust exemption to groups of firms collaborating in joint research projects by passing the National Cooperative Research Act of 1984 and the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993.2 A few 2 See the study undertaken by Scott [1988] for an empirical analysis of these research joint ventures.
? Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1998. famous consortia, including SEMATECH, received substantial direct subsidies from the federal government.3 The Clinton Administration has sought to strengthen federal government intervention in this area by increasing the budget of the Advanced Technology Program (ATP), which funds proposals for collaborative research from the private sector. European governments also attempted to foster the development of research consortia. ESPRIT (European Strategic Program for R&D in Information Technologies) and EUREKA are two famous examples of European multinational projects.
Despite this increase in the incidence of cooperative R&D, there have been few empirical studies which have attempted to estimate the effects of this cooperative R&D on research productivity.4 To a great extent, the adoption by European governments and US administrations of policies promoting R&D consortia was prompted by the perceived success of this policy instrument in Japan. Yet, much of the research that has been done on Japanese consortia has tended to focus on small numbers of highly publicized (and quite possibly atypical) case studies.5 Our paper represents an important departure from this tradition.
III. R&D CONSORTIA IN JAPAN III(i). Institutional and Historical Background
The promotion of R&D consortia in Japan has a long history, reaching all the way back to the late 1950s. We focus on its recent history for two reasorns. First, Japanese observers of R&D consortia point out that until the later 1970s, the focus of Japanese firms' R&D efforts was not on creating new technology so much as understanding, catching up to, or adapting Western technology for use in Japanese markets. That is less applicable now that Japan has reached the technological frontier. The second reason is more practical: prior to the early 1980s, data on Japanese R&D spending and patenting at the firm level is generally of poor quality. 3Ivrwin and Klenow [1996] have studied the impact of Sematech on semiconductor firms' R&D, profits, and labor productivity and concluded, on the basis of mixed evidence, that it did not have the desired effect. Albert Link, David Teece and William Finan [1996] , using participating firms' estimates of the rate of return of individual Sematech research projects, have come to a very different conclusion.
4 Most of the few empirical papers that have appeared in the economics literature draw upon 'one-time' surveys of firms. The general lack of any time-series dimension in the data severely constrains the ability of prior researchers to control for left out variables or endogeneity. Furthermore, most researchers lack any micro-level measure of research 'output', and therefore concentrate on the effects of participation on R&D spending or undertake an analysis of the 'motives for participation' using probit and ordered probit models. Compared to the overall level of government intervention in R&D in the West, the level of Japanese government support of R&D has been relatively small.6 Between 1960 and 1991, for example, the average level of US government spending on R&D, as a percentage of GDP, was 1.32%, while in Japan it was 0.47%. The contribution of government-sponsored R&D consortia to total R&D spending in Japan is also small, accounting for only 1.6% of total R&D expenditure during the same period (Sakakibara, [1997a,b] ).
Mariko Sakakibara [1994] has presented a detailed breakdown of the distribution of projects by industry, time, and budget. Her results are summarized in Tables I and II. A number of trends are evident from this sectoral distribution of projects and spending. First, government spending rose rapidly and peaked in the 1970s. In the 1980s, there was a substantial real decline in spending. To some extent this mirrored the general real decline in Japanese government discretionary spending in the 1980s as Japan's Ministry of Finance successfully labored to bring the overall budget into balance. Secondly, projects and spending were concentrated in a few sectors. The semiconductors/computers cluster stands out as a sector which has received a consistently high level of support over time. In particular, telecommunications and semiconductors/computers together constituted 41 of the 143 total projects during the 1980s (the period for which our microdata is most complete) and nearly 30% of total 6A sizable component of this difference can be traced to the role of defense-related R&D spending in the US, and to a lesser extent, in the UK and France. Japan is perhaps unique among large advanced countries in the extent to which national R&D spending has been financed by the private sector. This is changing somewhat in the very recent past as Japanese firms have responded to the prolonged 1990s recession in Japan by curtailing R&D expenditures and the Japanese government has increased its overall contribution to the national R&D effort. In relating Japanese R&D consortia to the theoretical literature of the previous section, a number of points need to be made. In general, Japanese R&D consortia involved some government subsidization of consortia R&D expenditures, lowering the effective cost of R&D. This strengthens the 'effective R&D cost-reducing' effect of participation which comes from economies of scale, avoidance of wasteful duplication, and ease of access of the necessary complementary resources for R&D in Katz's framework. Secondly, the government generally sought (not always successfully) to encourage complete dissemination of all research results to the participating firms. Furthermore, in selecting participants, the government generally sought to bring together firms with complementary research assets. This tendency has been especially strong since the early 1980s, which is the focus of our analysis. This implies that the level of intra-consortia spillover could be quite high. Finally, we would argue that the potentially vitiating effects of consortia R&D on second-stage industry profits are small. Consortia have frequently brought together firmnns that were not direct rivals in the product market. For instance, suppliers would come together with downstream firms to improve the efficiency of the production process. In some cases, the product market relationships between participants were complementary rather than rivalrous. Consortia also sought to target markets in which Japanese firms played a small role in global production and trade.8 If we assume that foreign firms received no spillovers from consortia R&D, then the impact on industry profits following Japanese entry would come solely from the impact of new Japanese products on the industry-but if the Japanese competitors were starting from a very small base, then this effect is second order in importance, whereas the spilloverenhancing and cost-reducing aspects of participation on Japanese consortia participants are first-order.
Even having made this assumption, theory does not necessarily guarantee that participation will lead firms to increase their R&D spending. Both the spillovers-enhancing and cost-reducing aspects of participation in consortia can be viewed as having both 'income' and 'substitution' effects. If participation allows firms to realize greater benefits from a given level of R&D, firms may choose to increase R&D spending if the 'substitution effect' dominates. On the other hand, they may actually reduce their R&D spending if the 'income effect' dominates. Based on our reading of the theoretical literature (especially Cohen and Levinthal), we think that substitution effects are likely to be more important.9 However, the data do not yield unambiguous evidence on this point.
Two final pieces of institutional background are worth mentioning, since they will affect our empirical work and the interpretation of our results. Prior to 1990, many if not most of the patents to directly emerge from the research undertaken within government-sponsored research consortia were, by government directive, assigned not to the participating firms but instead to the research consortia themselves. We are still in the process of obtaining data on patents assigned to these joint ventures. In our estimates reported in this paper, we include only data on patents assigned directly to firms. This means that we may systematically undermeasure the total direct benefits of the consortia.10 We are also missing, in this version, data on the government subsidy received per firm per project per year. This subsidy is not straightforward to compute, as the effective level of subsidy differs across firms, projects, and years, and the typical participating firm is involved in more than one project per year in our sample. Thus, we may 8 By the late 1970s, government assistance to established firms and industries had become increasingly difficult to justify both to the Japanese public and to Japan's trading partners. The 1980s and 1990s were marked by a redirection of government assistance toward new businesses and precommercial technological research.
9The balance between the 'income' and 'substitution' effects cannot be deduced analytically. There is an extensive theoretical literature which examines the determinants of R&D intensity (for a summary of this literature, see Reinganum, [1989] ). The outcomes of these models are highly assumption-sensitive, and these models cannot be easily nested (Cockburn and Henderson, [1994] ).
10 Of course, firms had an incentive to 'delay' patenting until after the official conclusion of the project to so that they could secure the intellectual property rights to their innovations, rather than have those intellectual property rights assigned to the joint venture. To the extent that this happened, our measures of the direct benefits of consortia are complete.
be undermeasuring the total social costs of consortia. This is unfortunate, and if our goal were to undertake a comprehensive 'social' cost/benefit analysis of these research consortia, this data problem would severely constrain our analysis. However, our goal in this paper is to undertake the more modest task of estimating the impact of participation on the research inputs and innovation of the firms themselves. We do have sufficient data on the private costs and benefits of the consortia, direct and indirect, to begin to undertake such analysis.1 The first key result is evidence on the firms' motives for participating in consortia. While firm R&D managers listed a number of motivations for seeking to participate in consortia, the most highly cited reason for seeking to participate in consortia was access to complementary knowledge assets of other participants.12 In particular, these firms consistently ranked this as a stronger motivation than that of sharing the costs of research with other firms. This survey evidence has been strongly reinforced by more recent anecdotal evidence obtained from conversations with Japanese R&D managers, industry observers, and MITI officials. It is primarily this fact which leads us to look for a specification that can directly test the effects of knowledge spillovers.
II(ii
The second is the effect of participation on the firm's own R&D spending. Government subsidies constituted as much as two-thirds of the total budget of the projects on average. This figur masks considerable heterogeneity within projects. There are some projects in which govern-1 If the theoretical models of research consortia are correct, then the knowledge spillovers that take place through participation in consortia should have an impact on firm research inputs and research productivity that goes beyond the narrow topics investigated by the consortia. Even if we do not observe all of the patents a firm generates through direct involvement in a certain project (because they are assigned to a research joint venture), we certainly observe the lingering effect of the project on the firm's subsequent research activities, and the subsidiary research activities that grow out of the initial project, as well as the costs associated with them. If these indirect effects are large, then we should find them in the data, even without complete information on the direct costs and benefits of consortia. As it turns out, we find evidence of such effects in the data.
12See Sakakibara [1997a] pp. 151-155 for details. ment provided 100 percent of the project budget, and there were others in which the government provided much less than half of the total budget. Nevertheless, in the majority of projects, government provided an important share of total costs. How do firms respond to these subsidies? Survey evidence and more anecdotal evidence strongly suggests that firms do not view government funding as a substitute for their own R&D spending, but rather increase their own R&D spending in response to these subsidies.13 This increase in expenditure arises in two ways. First, the typical project budget involves costs not accounted for in the government budget which must be borne by the firms. Second, firms often choose to invest in private R&D closely related to the consortia research in hopes of appropriating the benefits of that research. This increase in private R&D spending arises from two motivations. One is the direct substitution effect of the subsidy. The other, potentially more important factor is the spillover-augmenting interaction among firms that arise through participation in consortia.'4 Of course, these two effects are not mutually exclusive; in fact, they are mutually reinforcing. With the available data, it is not possible to distinguish precisely between these two effects. However, we do present evidence which suggests that 'spillover augmentation' is the primary component of the overall impact of participation.
The third important result arising from survey evidence is the firms' own subjective evaluation of consortia. Typically, firms R&D managers see the projects as being modestly beneficial to the firms, but not critical to their commercial success. A frequent criticism is that the focus of the projects on research close to the technological frontier often fails to generate immediate financial gains. In terms of costs, firms seem quite sensitive to the direct costs and the opportunity costs of participation in consortia. In particular, coordinating research activities across several different firm laboratories tends to pose a substantial burden on the time of key senior research personnel.
Finally, while it is difficult to document quantitatively, discussions with managers and MITI officials frequently drew attention to the issue of adverse selection.15 This arises both in terms of the selection of participants and the selection of projects. Firms which are technology leaders are 13The survey data suggest that, on average, participation in consortia raises private R&D spending on consortia-related topics by nearly 40% more than the level which firms would have undertaken in the absence of participation. See Sakakibara [1997b] for details. This is to be contrasted with the finding of Irwin and Klenow [1996] that participants in the Sematech consortia reduced their R&D spending. Wallsten [1996] finds that recipients of SBIR research grants reduce their R&D spending substantially as a result of receiving the grant.
14Sakakibara [1997a] showed evidence from the survey data that, after controlling for the government subsidy effect, the learning motive from other participants is likely to increase a firm's R&D spending.
15 See Sakakibara [1997bl. understandably more reluctant to participate in projects in which they perceive that they have relatively little to gain. This problem seems to have become more pronounced in recent years.16 In the same way, especially promising projects that can be profitably undertaken by the firms themselves are typically not the focus of government consortia. Instead, especially in the 1980s and 1990s, consortia projects have tended to involve more frontier research with greater uncertainty in the expected outcomes. We therefore establish the following predictions:
1. Participation in research consortia augments knowledge spillovers. 2. The spillover-augmenting effect of research consortia raises the 'research productivity' of participating firms, controlling for their R&D expenditures. 3. As a result of 1 and 2, participation in research consortia may lead to an increase in R&D spending.
Our paper will test predictions 1-3 using microdata drawn from a sample of participating and nonparticipating firms.
IV. EMPIRICAL MODELS FOR ESTIMATING THE IMPACT OF RESEARCH CONSORTIA
Our basic empirical strategy is two-fold. First, we establish that the intensity of participation in research consortia raises both the level of research input and the level of research output, with the latter measured by patents. Our analysis of patenting controls for both private research input and industry characteristics. Thus, the intensity of participation is found to have a modest, but significant impact on both research input and research productivity. Next, we attempt to identify the extent to which this positive impact on research productivity is produced by the augmenting or strengthening of spillover effects within consortia. To that end we introduce an empirical framework which allows us to measure spillovers, albeit indirectly, and infer their effects on research output.
IV(i). A Model of Research Productivity
The first step requires us to develop a model of research productivity. To do so, we postulate the following simple 'knowledge production function', suppressing time subscripts for the moment to simplify notation. 16It may be that as Japanese firms have become large players in many high-tech global product markets, they have increasingly internalized the 'competition-enhancing/profitreducing' effects technological cooperation might have on industry equilibrium output and profits. The presence of q, in the error term raises the specter of omitted variables bias, so it is worth a bit of discussion. The process by which the goals of R&D consortia and the participating firms are selected is a complex one, involving input from interested firms, academics, and MITI's own experts. Ultimately, however, MITI decides which firms participate in which projects. This assignment is not random. To the extent that they can observe it, it is quite likely that MITI officials tend to pick 'high q' firms more frequently for participation in research consortia. If we find that research productivity is positively correlated with the intensity of participation in consortia, it may be that the chain of causality runs from research productivity to participation rather than the other way around.18
To deal with this problem, we take two approaches. One is to use a model with firm 'fixed effects' (which also removes industry effects). Performing least squares on our transformed equation In which case, OLS gives us inconsistent results and even fixed effects estimates are not guaranteed to be consistent, because in this specification the individual effect is allowed to evolve over time-it is not, in fact, fixed. If (8) truly describes the movement of our measure of participation, then we cannot identify its impact. Let us suppose though, that the movement of C is actually described by (9) Cit = 00 + Olqit 02rit + 03Ci,t-k + 04Ci,t-k-+ 05Ci,-k-2 + 0dd + Vit d Equation (9) implies that there is some 'bureaucratic' inertia to the selection process. Firms that were frequently picked in the past are more 18 There is also the problem of confounding the effects of consortia with exogenous changes in technological opportunity. If consortia are quickly established in 'hot' fields, it may be that our estimates are picking up not the direct effects of consortia but the indirect effects of these changes in technological opportunity. Our ability to control for this at the firm level is limited, though we believe that some of these technological opportunity effects are likely captured in our year and industry dummy variables.
likely to be picked in the present regardless of their true research quality. This sort of behavior, perhaps the result of slow adjustment of firms' reputations within MITI to actual changes in research quality, is quite consistent with the experience of the authors, both of whom have had official connections to MITI in the past. It is also consistent with the autoregressive properties of the ci series. Thus, even if qit evolves partially as a function of participation in consortia, we can achieve identification by using 'predetermined' or k-lagged values of Ct as instruments, where k is a lag long enough to be exogenous with respect to q. The proper procedure to employ is two stage least squares. Thus, we estimate a version of (9) using only the exogenous variables (10) Cit = 00 + 02rit + 03Ci,t-k + 04Ci,t-k05Ci,t-k-2 + E OdAid + Vit d
We obtain from (10) a predicted value for C, Ci,, as the first stage of obtaining consistent estimates through 2SLS.19 Heretofore we have discussed linear regression models. However, patent data are actually count data whose distribution is quite skewed. Problems arise in applying linear regression models to such data, particularly when there are a nontrivial number of firm-years for which the number of patents recorded, either in the US or in Japan, is zero. Of course, the natural log of zero is not identified, so the dependent variable is transformed by adding 1 to all observations and taking the log of this sum. Concerns that this sort of arbitrary transformation, which is standard in the older patents-R&D literature, might affect the results motivated us to estimate a set of nonlinear versions of (5), using empirical models based on the Poisson and Negative Binomial distributions. We also estimate the fixed-effects version of the Negative Binomial model developed by Hausman, Hall and Griliches [1984] . These models are developed in the Technical Appendix, which the reader can find posted on the Journal of Industrial Economics editorial web page. Results are given in the supplementary Table A-1, also posted on the web page. As the reader will see, these models give us results very similar to our linear models. We assume that, in the short run, a firm's position in technology space is fixed. Over time, of course, a firm can change its position by building technological expertise in new areas, but this takes time and the 'adjustment costs' associated with this kind of change can be high. For this reason, we calculate for each firm in our sample a single location vector based on its patenting behavior over the entire sample period.
IV(ii). An Empirical Frameworkfor Measuring
We can measure the 'technological proximity' between two firms by measuring the degree of similarity in their patent portfolios. Firms working on the same technologies will tend to patent in the same technological areas. We can state this more precisely: the 'distance' in 'technology space' between two firms i and j can be approximated by Thj where Tj is the uncentered correlation coefficient of the F vectors of the two firms, or 
V. EMPIRICAL ESTIMATES OF THE IMPACT OF CONSORTIA
We have collected data on 226 firms' R&D spending, sales, capital stock, labor and materials usage, and patenting in the US as well as in Japan, for Table I shows that we have reasonably representative coverage of the universe of projects in our data for the 1980s.
22 Our data on the Japanese patents of Japanese firms is considerably more limited than our data on their US patents due to the difficulty and expense of obtaining Japanese patent data by firm.
23 Our sample was selected on the basis of availability of micro data on research inputs and outputs. It thus consists of firms that are, on average, larger and more R&D intensive than is generally the case in the 'universe' of Japanese manufacturing firms. This is especially true for the 'infrequent participants'.
R&D input and output variables of the firm. Controlling for industry effects and R&D spending, we estimate a 'patent' production function to assess the extent to which participation improves 'R&D efficiency'. Finally, we attempt to test if spillovers are stronger, on average, among participating firms. Table III gives data on firms that were infrequent participants in MITI-organized research consortia. Since the typical consortium lasted more than one calendar year, we made our division on the basis of 'project years'. Using Sakakibara's data, for each firm in each year we noted how many consortia it was concurrently involved in. We summed these 'project-years' over the entire sample period for each firm. Firms with 11 or fewer project-years over the entire sample period were deemed infrequent participants. Firms with more than 11 project years were deemed frequent participants.24 Table IV shows data on frequent participants. It is immediately obvious that frequent participants were significantly larger and more R&D intensive than nonparticipants. Frequent participants also tended to take out more patents in the US and in Japan. One traditional measure of R&D intensity is the R&D/sales ratio. A Wilcoxon rank-sum test for the equality of the median R&D/sales ratio in both subsamples strongly rejected the hypothesis of equality, providing us with our first statistical evidence that they do, though the actual magnitude of the difference is relatively small. Nevertheless, in terms of absolute yen expenditures, the frequent participants spend much more since, at the median, they are more than 5 times as large as the nonparticipants as measured by size. Because of this clear size difference as well as differences in the industry mix of frequent participants and others, we need to make this comparison using control variables.
V(i). Sample Statistics

V(ii). Effect of Participation on R&D Spending
We have run such a regression, using the log of firm i's capital stock to control for size and using industry dummies as additional control variables. Thus, our equation is per year, so the cumulative effect of a transition from being a nonparticipant to a frequent participant could be quite substantial. For instance, an increase in intensity of participation on the order of an additional 5 projects per year is associated with an increase in total R&D spending of over 10%. However, we must note that while our random effects estimates are robust to the inclusion of a full set of time dummies, our fixed effects results are not.27 This arises partially because a fixed effects model sweeps out all of the cross-sectional variance, which is most of the total variance in the data. Taking out common time series variance leaves relatively little 'signal' in the data relative to the 'noise'. However, we acknowledge that the evidence for the impact of participation on R&D spending is not as robust as some of the other evidence we present in this paper.
V(iii). Patent Production Function
We have found some evidence that participating firms are more R&D-intensive, a result that is consistent with the predictions of theory. Can we also make statistical inference regarding the productivity of that R&D spending? Here, we continue our exploration of the data by looking for a statistical relationship between a firm's 'productivity' of R&D and its 'intensity' of participation in R&D consortia. We measure productivity as patents generated per year, controlling for R&D spending, industry effects, and firm effects. Results from both a random effects specification and a fixed effects specification are provided. The equation we seek to estimate is Table VI.  The results in Table VI show a positive and significant relationship between participation and patenting.28 Here we use the numbers of US patents granted to Japanese firms as our dependent variable, though the results using Japanese patent applications are qualitatively similar. Note that, here and elsewhere, patents are dated by the date of application rather than the date when the patent is granted. This avoids the problem 27 See Table A-7 on the JIE editorial web page. 28 In these equations, we regress patents by the ith firm in the tth year on the number of research joint ventures that firm has participated in during that year. If research consortia augment firm patenting through R&D spillovers, then one might expect its effects to enter with some lag. The short time series dimension of the data and the limited variation in participation in that dimension are such that the lag structure is difficult to estimate. Also note these results are robust to the inclusion of the measure of firm size and number of patent already held. See supplementary Table A-8 on the JIE editorial web page. While there are a number of reasons to think that at least some of the effect of participation on patenting is practically contemporaneous,31 as we have modeled it, there are also reasons to believe that the full impact only comes after a lag of one or two years. In particular, a two-year lag makes sense because research personnel are typically rotated into research consortia, then rotated back to the parent firm on a two-year cycle. When these research personnel return to the firm, they presumably bring with them a substantial amount of explicit and 'tacit' knowledge about the new technology being developed within the consortia. To allow for these lags in a simple way, we substituted one and two-period lagged measures of participation in place of our contemporaneous measures and re-estimated our fixed effect model. The results are qualitatively similar to the ones reported in Table VI Table VI.32 The alternative to a fixed effects approach is to use instrumental variables. In Table VII we present results based on the 2SLS model we developed in equations (8)-(10). The table presents results using both the log of patents registered by Japanese firms in the US and results using firms' patent applications to the Japanese patent office. The results are qualitatively similar to the fixed effects results, though the magnitudes are larger. The R2 from our first stage regression of research consortia on our vector of exogenous variables and instruments is slightly more than 0.7, indicating a reasonably good fit. In our results, we used 7, 8 and 9 period lags of counts of project-years as instruments. Note that the point estimates of the impact of an additional consortium on research productivity are, in the case of the regression using Japanese patent applications, considerably higher that those which we obtained in our fixed effects model. These estimates imply that an increase in intensity of participation on the order of two projects per year would increase research productivity (as measured by patents per R&D dollar) by between 10% and 16%.33 We found that the 2SLS results do not qualitatively change when time dummies are included. We also found that the results do not qualitatively change when we use two-period lagged measures of participation rather than a contemporaneous measure of participation.34 Of course, we do not include in these regressions measures of the government subsidies provided to the firms. An alternative interpretation of our results is that we are simply picking up the output effects of unmeasured subsidies. A 'back of the envelope' calculation strongly suggests that this interpretation is unlikely to be true. While we do not have precise data on the subsidies offered per firm per project per year, we can roughly approximate it. There are 131 consortia in which the firms in our sample participated during the years 1983 to 1989. If we allocate the total project budgets for these consortia equally over the planned duration of the projects, we obtain a figure of 503484 million yen (in constant prices) in government subsidies for these projects over the seven years of our sample period. In order to obtain a subsidy figure per firm per year, we divide this sum by the number of firms which participated in these projects in each year (including participating firms for which we do not have R&D or patent data). Thus, the average per firm per project per year 33 We used a Lagrange Multiplier test to test the validity of our instruments by regressing the residuals from the second stage of our two-stage least squares regression on the instruments used in the first stage. The null hypothesis that our instruments were valid is strongly supported by the data.
34 See supplementary 
V(iv). Patents and Spillovers
Finally, we present indirect estimates of the impact of consortia on knowledge spillovers. We do not have enough degrees of freedom to allow y to vary with the number of project-years. Instead, we divide our sample into nonparticipants/infrequent participants and frequent participants and allow the parameter y to vary across the two subsamples. In practice, this is done by running a regression including an interaction term in which the spillover term is multiplied by a dummy variable signifying whether or not the firm is a 'frequent' participant. In some specifications, we also allow the intercept terms of frequent participants to differ from those of other firms.
In the regression results presented in Table VIII , it does seem that the patent output elasticity of spillovers, as we measure them, is much higher for the frequent participant subsample. We interpret these results as suggesting that it is indeed through the channel of augmenting spillovers that research consortia raise both R&D levels and R&D productivity. We estimated 36This may explain why Saxonhouse [forthcoming] has failed to find robust evidence of a strong effect of project announcements on participating firms' stock prices. The subsidies provided to the firms are small enough and the nature of research done within consortia far enough removed from commercialization that the immediate impact on stock prices is not large relative to day-to-day fluctuations in stock prices.
3Recall that the estimated innovative output elasticity of own R&D spending is less than 1. This implies that our estimate of the incidence of the government subsidy would have to underestimate the 'true' incidence by a factor of 6 to 8 in order to fully explain even the lower bound of our range of estimates of the effect of participation on innovative output. Table VIII are representative of our findings. In the OLS model, the interaction term is positive and significant, but small in magnitude. In general, allowing the constant term to vary as well as the spillover parameter results in very large differences in the innovation output elasticity of the spillover term in the subsample. Allowing a separate constant term does have a useful interpretation. The managerial literature suggests that there are substantial 'coordination costs' associated with the management of research consortiao38 Research personnel must invest considerable time and energy in coordinating research activities across firm boundaries and overcoming the natural tendency to free-ride on the efforts of other participants. It is quite likely that the separate intercept term for frequent participants is picking up the effects of these coordination costs. The sign and magnitude of the coefficient suggest that these costs are quite substantial, a finding completely in accordance with the view of the managerial literature.39 Finally, we note that, in a fixed effects version of (18), the interaction term is positive and of reasonably high magnitude, but is statistically insignificant. This result is not surprising, given our small sample size and the fact that our spillover term is certainly measured with error, a problem which is exacerbated when we use fixed effects models. These results suggest that participation is associated with increased impact of spillovers, but the evidence is not conclusive. 39Sakakibara has found direct evidence of this in her interviews with Japanese R&D managers. She also cites the work of other researchers which confirms the existence and importance of these costs in Sakakibara [I 997a].
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND EXTENSIONS
Our preliminary exploration of the data suggests that the predictions we made about the effect of participation in research consortia on R&D performance find support in the data. Namely, 1. Participation in R&D consortia tends to be associated with higher levels of R&D spending of participatingfirms. 2. Participation in R&D consortia also seems to raise the research productivity ofparticipating firms. 3. Finally, our results suggest that at least one channel by which consortia have these positive effects is through effectively augmenting knowledge spillovers.
Based on our empirical results we can assign numbers to these effects. The estimated elasticity of participation in an additional consortium on R&D spending from our fixed effects and 2SLS estimates suggests that if a firm participates in an additional project per year, it will raise its total R&D spending by about 2% and its patenting per R&D dollar (i.e. its research productivity) by between 4% and 8%. These sound like small effects, but the cumulative impact of a large increase in the intensity of participation in research consortia could be substantial.
In addition to the benefits of consortia, however, we have also found evidence of their costs. The managerial literature suggests that the coordination of research across firms can impose substantial administrative burdens on the research personnel of participating firms. We have presented econometric evidence consistent with this view in Table VIII . Nevertheless, our results on the whole suggest that the net benefits of participation are positive.
Viewed as an instrument of industrial policy, our results to date suggest that the consortia did have the effect of stimulating innovative activity by the selected firms. We have not included a measure of the cost of government subsidies or the administrative costs incurred nor do we yet have measures of the patents assigned directly to the joint ventures, so a true 'social' cost/benefit analysis of consortia is beyond the scope of the present paper. However, the finding of a positive effect of participation on innovation is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for demonstrating that subsidizing consortia was a worthwhile social investment.
This analysis strongly suggests future directions for research. R&D consortia tend to target technologies that are only a small part of a firm's total research effort, and one might not expect to find clear effects of the consortia on the entire R&D and product portfolio of whole firm. We do find small, but statistically robust, effects of participation on research inputs, productivity, and spillovers at the firm level. Nevertheless, a better approach, and one which allows us more leverage over the nettlesome issue of causal interpretation, would be to undertake our analysis at the project level.40 Further investigation into the impact of participation in an individual project on a firm's ex-post patenting in the targeted technology class, and the identification of the determinants of successful projects is soundly warranted.
The results of our firm-level analysis strongly suggest that this is a fruitful area of research. Our review of the policy history in this area suggests that governments throughout the advanced world will continue to resort to R&D consortia as a means of bridging the gap between the social and private benefits of R&D. We may have much to learn from the successes and failures of the Japanese experience,
